Michigan Law Review
Volume 81

Issue 2

1982

Statutes of Limitations and Opting Out of Class Actions
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Statutes of Limitations and Opting Out of Class Actions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 399
(1982).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

NOTES
Statutes of Limitations and Opting Out of Class Actions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides for class actions. 1 A
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all only if (l) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(l) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opJ)osing the class, or
(B) acljudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions oflaw or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
ts superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judgement;
Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(l) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(l) or
(b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the
court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed,
and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.
{d) Orders in Conduct ofActions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,
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plaintiff2 brings a class action by filing a complaint on behalf of herself and a defined group similarly situated. "As soon as practicable
after the commencement of an action brought as a class action," 3 the
district judge must decide whether or not to "certify" the class,
thereby allowing or disallowing the adjudication of the suit as a class
action. 4 A certification order must specify the particular type of class
action approved by the court.5 One species of class action, permitted
under rule 23(b)(3), requires that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members."6 In these 23(b)(3) suits, the
plaintiff notifies the class members of the action after certification.7
the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses,
or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties
or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;
(5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order
under rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
FED. R. C1v. P. 23.
2. In a plaintiff's class action, the named class representative sues on behalf of the entire
class. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a). The rule also provides that class members "may . . . be sued
as representative parties on behalf of all." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a). This Note is concerned only
with plaintiff class actions; the problems of statutes of limitations and defendant class actions
are outside its scope.
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l).
4. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text. The court may also alter or amend this
order before the decision on the merits. See note 100 infra and accompanying text.
5. The class action must fall within one of the three categories in rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(l)
allows class actions where separate actions could create the risk of either inconsistent adjudications imposing incompatible standards of conduct on a party, or adjudications which as a
practical matter would determine the interests of other class members not parties to the action.
See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(l) advisory committee note on 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39
F.R.D. 69, 100-01 (1966). Subdivision (b)(2) encompasses actions where injunctive relief, applicable to the class as a whole, is the appropriate, final relief. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note on 1966 amendment, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). For a
discussion of actions certified under 23(b)(3), see notes 6-9 infra and accompanying text.
6. In the spurious action, the suit did not adjudicate the rights of anyone not a party to the
action. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on the 1966 amendments, reprinted in
39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966). For a discussion of the abuses of the spurious action, see note 128
infra.
7. Rule 23(c)(2) states that "the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable." In Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974), the Supreme
Court stated that the plaintiff must bear the cost of such notice. See also 3B J. MOORE & J.
KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 23.55, at 23-453 (2d ed. 1982); Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D 39, 40-41 (1967). For a discussion of
what constitutes the "best notice practicable" under the rule, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974).
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The notice informs the class members of their right to "opl"•out" of
the suit. Opting out excludes the individual from the class suit. 8
Failure to opt out subjects the individual to the binding effect of a
judgment in the class action.9
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 10 the Supreme
Court considered the relationship between class action procedure
and the principles underlying statutes of limitations. The Court held
that the filing of a class action tolls 11 the statute of limitations for
putative class members who attempt to intervene in the original action after the denial of class certification. 12 Despite the narrow scope
of this holding, the broad reasoning 13 and language 14 of the opinion
8. Subdivision (c)(2) states that the notice must advise each class member that "the court
will exclude him from the class ifhe so requests by a specified date." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2).
Opting out is limited to class actions certified under subdivision (b)(3). In the other two
categories of rule 23 actions, the final judgment will decide the rights of all members of the
class. Even if they could opt out, the class members would not be able to avoid the effects of
the judgment. An injunction issued in a (b)(2) action, for example, would enjoin all illegal
action. Class members would necessarily be affected by such broad relief.
Courts have the discretionary power under subdivision (d) to extend the opt-out rule to
(b)(l) and (b)(2) suits, but have declined to do so. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Weinberger, 66 F.R.D.
601,604 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295,300 (E.D. La. 1970).
One commentator has asserted that where courts wish to allow absentees to exclude themselves
from the injunctive relief, the court will define the suit as a (b)(3) suit. See .Developments in the
Law- Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1485 n.169 (1976).
9. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(3).
10. 414 U.S. 538 (1974). lnAmerican Pipe, the class action was filed eleven days before the
running of the statute of limitations. Class certification was then denied because the class
members were not so numerous as to make joinder in a regular action impracticable. Upon
denial, class members attempted to intervene in the sole remaining action, that of the would-be
class representative. 414 U.S. at 541-44.
l l. For the purposes of this discussion, "tolled" means "suspended." See generally, Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights ofAction and State
Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 101 l, 1084-85 (1980); Comment, Class Actions
and Statutes of Limitations, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 106, 115 (1981). The time during which a
statute is tolled does not count in determining the limitations period.
12. The Court held:
[A]t least where class action status has been denied solely because of failure to demonstrate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable," the
commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported
members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the
suit inappropriate for class action status.
414 U.S. 552-53 (quoting FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(l)).
13. The Court stated that where the class suit met the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of rule 23(a):
the claimed members of the class stood as parties to the suit until and unless they received
notice thereof and chose not to continue. Thus, the commencement of the action satisfied
the purpose of the limitation provision as to all those who might subsequently participate
in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs. To hold to the contrary would frustrate the
principal function of a class suit, because then the sole means by which members of the
class could assure their participation in the judgment if notice of the class suit did not
reach them until after the running of the limitation period would be to file earlier individual motions to join or intervene as parties - precisely the multiplicity of activity which
rule 23 was designed to avoid in those cases where a class action is found "superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Rule
23(b)(3).
414 U.S. at 550-51.
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have confused the lower courts. 15 The Court's subsequent reassertion, in dicta, that American Pipe "established that commencement
of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all
members of the class" 16 compounded this confusion. One of the issues engendered by this uncertain Supreme Court guidance 17 is
whether one who opts out of a certified class and then brings a sepa14. The opinion, !hough limiting !he holding to the facts of the case, expressly applies to

"all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene." 414 U.S. at 553
(emphasis added).
IS. The Court stressed that the statute is tolled where certification is denied "solely" because oflack of numerosity. Courts have discussed whether other reasons for denying certification will also result in tolling. See, e.g., Sanders v. Faraday Laboratories, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 99,
103 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (toll even though !he class lacks adequate representation because the
representative failed to prosecute !he class claim vigorously); Miller v. Central Chinchilla
Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D 41 I, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (toll even though common questions did not
predominate); Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586, 590 (D. Md. 1974)
(toll even !hough class too amorphous).
The broad reasoning has also caused differing opinions over whether a restrictive or an
expansive reading ofAmerican Pipe should be applied. Compare qiuck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F,
Supp. 608,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Second Circuit applies American Pipe only as far as its facts),
with Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760-61 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane) (American
Pipe eliminates statute oflimitations problems), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). Some courts
do not decide the issue. See Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 178 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425. U.S. 912 (1976).
Many courts refer to American Pipe in dicta or make unsupported statements about its
holding or bolh. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.28 (7th Cir,
1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 929 (1976); Parker v. Bell Helicopter
Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 513 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 419 F. Supp,
1116, 1121 n.19 (D. Hawaii 1976); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394,
396 (D. Md. 1974), ajfd., 520 F.2d 871 (41h Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975).
16. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974) (emphasis added). In this
case, !he plaintiff argued that individual notice was not always required under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(c)(2). See note 7 supra and accompanying text. The plaintiff argued that,
among other reasons, notice was not required because class members would not opt out. Members would "not opt out because the statute of limitations has long since run out on the claims
of all class members." 417 U.S. at 176 n.13. The Court then stated the dicta quoted in text.
Some courts have found this dicta "highly persuasive." McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic
Transmissions, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,359, at 71,266 (E.D. Mich. 1977); see
Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1982) (Norris, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme
Court could not have spoken more clearly."); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 448
n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Other courts have been "not so persuaded," Wachovia Bank & Trust v.
National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (D.D.C.), revd. on other grounds,
650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981), or found the language "puzzling." Stull v. Bayard, 424 F. Supp. 937, 943 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977).
Several courts have noted that these dicta seem extremely broad, but have declined to express
any opinion on it. See Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346 nn.21 & 22 (5th Cir.
1981); Brame v. Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568,585 n.17 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). Finally, other
courts concerned wilh class action tolling questions have not cited !he Eisen footnote at all.
See Ameil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Gluck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F. Supp. 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
17. In Parker v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 677 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct,
338 (1982) (No. 82-118), !he Fourth Circuit tolled !he statute where class certification was
denied and the plaintiff subsequently filed a separate suit. Though not the same issue debated
in this Note, where class certification is granted and the plaintiff opts out, the Parker problem
has split !he circuits. See Ameil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 782-83 (2d Cir. 1977) (American
Pipe only mandates tolling after certification denial where class members intervene in the original action, not where !hey attempt to file separate actions). The Court decision in Parker
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rate suit should benefit from the tolling of the statute for the duration of her membership in the class. 18 The lower courts have differed
on the answer to this question. 19
This Note argues that one who opts out of a class action should
should shed light on how broadly American Pipe and the subsequent Eisen dicta are to be
construed. See generally notes 15-16 supra and note 19 infra.
The Court has also granted certiorari to resolve a more distantly related American Pipe
problem. In Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, sub nom. Chardon v.
Soto, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982) (No. 82-271), the Court of Appeals started the statute oflimitations
running anew after denial of class certification. This result, reached through an application of
Puerto Rican law,see 681 F.2d at 49-50, contrasts withAmerican Pipe. InAmerican Pipe, the
Court held the statute of limitations resumed running on the federal antitrust claim upon denial of certification. 414 U.S. at 560-61.
18. After the plaintiff opts out of the class action, he or she is not entitled to any additional
tolling that may accrue to class members. Opting out severs the plaintiff's relationship with the
class - the only reason that tolling might be allowed. When the reason for tolling ends, the
statute starts to run again. See, e.g., Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356,361 (N.D.
Ala. 1980) (even if tolling was allowed, the statute had run), affd., 648 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1981).
Thus, whether the statute is tolled for the time the plaintiff was in the class becomes very
important. Unless the statute was tolled while she was a class member, her action will be time
barred. One example of a situation where this question has been important is the following: A
class action is filed but several large plaintiffs opt out. If the defendant decides to settle the
suit, a big factor in his or her willingness to negotiate and settle is whether the people who
opted out can later bring another action.
19. TheAmerican Pipe Court sought to preserve the efficiency of the class action device. It
reasoned !}lat if courts do not toll after the denial of class certification, putative class members
would file suits before the certification decision to protect themselves. American Pipe, 414
U.S. at 553; see note 13 supra; notes 34-35 infra and accompanying text.
One court favored a flat no-tolling rule as most consistent with the American Pipe case.
The court did not discuss the Eisen dicta. Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356, 3606 I (N.D. Ala. 1980) (holding plaintiff time-barred even if tolling allowed), affd, 648 F.2d 337
(5th Cir. 1981). Other courts have found Eisen controlling. Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc.,
419 F. Supp. 1116, 1191 n.19 (D. Hawaii 1976) (dicta; would toll even though class not certified); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437,448 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dicta). In McAlpine
v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. ~ 61,359 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the
court tolled the statute for those who filed their own suits before the time for opting out ends.
In this case, the defendant was engaged in a continuing wrong. Tolling just extended the period for which plaintiffs could seek recompense. In Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d
339, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1981), the court adopted a unique solution. The court noted simply that
tolling is an equitable doctrine. Since the plaintiffs had waited nineteen months after opting
out to file their suit, equity would not excuse their delay.
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 101013 (D.D.C. 1978), rerd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
954 (1981), the plaintiffs filed their suit before the class was certified. The court felt they had
"been manipulating the tolling doctrine" since they evidently never relied on or considered
joining the class action suit. The court might have tolled if "following certification, they had
determined that the class action strategy would not protect their rights and had then promptly
filed a separate action. . . ." 461 F. Supp. at 1012.
Other courts faced with related tolling questions have also tried to advance these policies.
See, e.g., Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (class certification denied; would only
toll for those who intervened in the original action, not for those who filed separate suits after
the denial; refused to follow Eisen dicta); Arneil v. ,Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 782-83 (2d Cir.
1977) (class certification denied; would only toll for intervenors in original action; Eisen not
discussed); Gluck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F. Supp. 608, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (only toll for intervenors; Eisen not discussed). Other courts have tolled where the class members filed separate suits
instead of intervening. See Parker v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 677 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1982)
(class certification denied), cert. granted, sub nom. Chardon v. Soto, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982) (No.
82-118); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.28 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and
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not benefit from tolling for the time during which the individual was
a class member. Part I develops an analytical framework, grounded
in the underlying policies of statutes of limitations and applied in
recent Supreme Court decisions, for resolving tolling questions. This
Part concludes that a plaintiff must show that tolling will not conflict
with the policy purposes animating statutes of limitations, as well as
a policy reason that favors tolling. Part II applies the first of these
parameters to the opt-out situation, and concludes that tolling typically would not offend the policy concerns behind statutes of limitations. Part III examines the consequences of tolling for the interests
served by the class action procedure. Given the weight accorded to
these competing interests by American Pipe and its progeny, the policy balance shifts convincingly against tolling the limitations period
for those who opt out of the class action. Courts confronting this
issue should accordingly honor the reasoning of American Pipe
rather than dicta suggesting a rule broader than its rationale.
l.

THE DOCTRINE OF TOLLING

The case of a plaintiff who opts out of a certified class action and
files an individual complaint following the passage of the original
limitations period does not involve the traditional disability exceptions20 to the time bar provided for in the statute itself2 1 or created
remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 929 (1976); Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507,
513 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
20. The normal tolling situation is where the plaintiff did not bring suit in time because of
a disability beyond her control. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428-29
(1965) (tolling allowed in cases where "plaintiff has not slept on his rights, but, rather has been
prevented from asserting them"); Inada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff
alleged sham investigation by police but this did not change his right to sue and it was not
sufficient justification for tolling); Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp. 261,272 (D. Md. 1974) (statute not "tolled in the absence of some insuperable barrier to the bringing of the action"); Hall
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358,360 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (tolling is allowed
when the plaintiff was prevented from getting relief by circumstances beyond his or her control); Vernon, The l/n!form Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems, 12
VAND. L. REV. 971, 982 (1959) (extension allowed when delay in bringing suit is beyond
plaintiffs control); Special Project, supra note 11, at 1084 (toll if circumstances beyond plaintiffs control prevented suit); J)evelopments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1177, 1220 (1950) (toll when plaintiff is hindered or prevented from bringing suit because
of disability or conduct of defendant; burden of proving applicability of tolling is on plaintill);
Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1144 n.111 (1979) (toll•
ing prevents running of statute of limitations when plaintiffs delay is justifiable), q. Kenney
v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1965) (after statutory period has run, libellant
has burden of proving that the delay has not prejudiced the respondent and that there is a good
excuse to justify invocation of the doctrine of tolling), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966); McMahon v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 297 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1962) (same). Where, for
example, the defendant fraudulently conceals the cause of action from the plaintiff, or induces
her to wait beyond the statutory period, courts will toll the statute of limitations. See, e.g.,
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100,
1119 (7th Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Dunlnp v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 478 F. Supp. 610, 611 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Similarly where the plaintiffs delay was the
result of infancy, insanity or death, tolling is allowed. See, e.g., Head,•. Children's Hosp., 407
Mich. 388, 285 N.W.2d 203 (1979) (infancy); Geisland v. Csutoroas, 78 Mich. App. 624, 261
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by courts of equity.22 Rather, the correct application of the statute of
limitations in this situation turns on whether the timely commencement of a related legal proceeding (the class action) suspends the
expiration of the limitations period so as to permit the individual's
action. While the law has long required the plaintiff seeking relief
from the time bar to bear the burden of proving that it should be
lifted,23 the showing sufficient to carry this burden has eluded rigorN.W.2d 537 (1977) (insanity); Schneider v. Fox, 73 Mich. App. 595, 252 N.W.2d 530 (1977)
(death of plaintifi). Other disabilities justifying tolling are when war causes "internment
abroad, see, e.g., Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1947), and incarceration,
see, e.g., Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968). In Burnett v. New York Cent.
R.R., 380 U.S 424 (1965), the statute was tolled when the plaintiffs original state claim was
dismissed for improper venue and the state did not have a transfer of action procedure. In all
of these situations, the plaintiff can demonstrate that a disability beyond her control caused the
delay. The plaintiff asserts as an affirmative reason for tolling that she, through no fault of her
own, was prevented from vindicating her rights. If tolling is denied, infants, the insane, and
those fraudulently deceived will almost always be left without a remedy.
21. Many statutes of limitations explicitly provide for suspension of the statute for the
traditional disabilities. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 600.5852-.5855 (1979) (death, absence
from the state, war, and fraudulent concealment suspend the statute); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.5851 (1979) (infancy, insanity, and imprisonment). For cases discussing statutory tolling,
see, e.g., Echols v. Chrysler Corp., 633 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1980) (fraudulent concealment);
Lemson v. General Motors Corp., 66 Mich. App. 94, 238 N.W.2d 414 (1975) (fraudulent
concealment).
22. Historically, courts of equity would often offer a forum to a plaintiff whose action at
law was barred by the statute, provided that the balance of equities justified the failure to bring
the action at law within the statutory period. See 2 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 1521,
at 848 (13th ed. 1886) ("Courts of Equity not only act in obedience and in analogy to the
Statutes of Limitations in proper cases, but they also interfere in many cases to prevent the bar
of the statutes where it would be inequitable or unjust."). The classic example of "equitable
tolling" is the exception for fraudulent concealment, which originated in equity before it began
to appear in the statutes. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). But courts have relied
on the authority inherited from the chancellor to justify tolling in other contexts. See Wood v.
Combustion Engr., 643 F.2d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Equity, therefore, may frequently come
to the rescue of a plaintiff who, for one reason or another, has been prevented from timely
filing suit.") (court declined to toll). Modem courts, however, have become quite restrained in
their approach to creating exceptions to the limitations bar. See note 42 i,!fra.
Viewing the tolling doctrine as a creature of equity is perfectly consistent with the policyoriented approach taken by recent Supreme Court decisions and relied upon by this Note.
"Balancing competing policies" and "weighing the equities" are essentially identical, outcomeoriented approaches to legal analysis. This is especially so in this context, where plaintifl's
claim for relief must be weighed against the maxim "Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas
subvenit," "equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." 2 J. POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 418, at 169 (5th ed. 1941).
23. It is well settled that the plaintiff, to overcome the status quo, has the burden ofjustifying tolling. E.g., Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (party claiming exception to the statute oflimitations has the burden of showing it), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981);
Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff has burden of proving
facts necessary to toll); Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d Cir. 1979)
(burden on plaintiff to prove statute tolled when suit filed after the limitations period); NLRB
v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 383 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940
(1979) (party seeking to avoid statute oflimitations has burden of proof and all presumptions
are against him or her); De Witt v. United States, 593 F.2d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1979) (party
claiming exception to statute of limitations must prove it); see also lnada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d
485, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing plaintifl's failure to show a proper basis for equitable
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ous definition. 24
Essentially, the issue depends on "a value judgment concerning
the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale
ones."25 This judgment in tum requires balancing the policy interests protected by statutes of limitations against the policy interests
furthered by tolling in a particular case,26 and the Supreme Court
has adopted his analysis in recent decisions. 27
tolling); Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1965), (libelant has burden of
justifying tolling) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
Deciding the content of the plaintiff's burden is important for two reasons. First, the plaintiff must know what must be proved and what evidence must be presented. Second, the judge
needs a standard against which to measure the evidence to see if the plaintiff has proved the
necessity of tolling; he or she must be able to decide when tolling is proper.
24. No comprehensive paradigm for analyzing limitations issues has emerged either from
the decided cases or legal commentary. See J)evelopments in the Law: Statutes ofLimitatio11s,
supra note 20, at 1178 (no comprehensive study since Wood's last edition in 1916). Commentary and decisions have tended to focus on particular problems, and the resulting jurisprudence has a somewhat ad hoc character.
American Pipe presents a typical analysis. After discussing the facts and procedural posture of the case, the Court plunged into the history of the rule 23 class action device. 414 U.S.
at 545-50. Upon reaching the modern version of the rule, the Court quickly came to the conclusion that by fulfilling the time bar policies, the filing of a class action suit satisfied the
limitations statute for class members. 414 U.S. at 550-51. The Court then discussed how the
denial of class certification affected this result, holding that a limited tolling rule was appropriate. 414 U.S. at 552-56; see note 12 supra and accompanying text. In this discussion, the
functional purposes of time bars were considered at somewhat more length than before. 414
U.S. at 554-55. At the end of this analysis, the Court concluded that "the tolling rule we
establish here is consistent both with the procedures of rule 23 and with the proper function of
the limitations statute." 414 U.S. at 555. At no time earlier in the decision did the Court
explain that this consistency was either desirable or required.
25. Board of Regents of the Univ. ofN.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,485 (1980) (quoting
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)).
26. The disability exceptions may be viewed as weighing the policy interests protected by
plaintifl's substantive cause of action against the policy interests protected by statutes of limitations. Where a plaintiff is prevented from asserting a cause of action, enforcing the time bar
would completely sacrifice the interests protected by that cause of action. Conversely, where
the plaintiff has negligently forgone a cause of action, she has, in effect, waived her interest in
enforcing it after the passage of the limitations period. Thus in Burnett v. New York Cent.
R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), the Court noted that the "policy of repose, designed to protect
defendants, is frequently outweighed, however, where the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff's rights." 380 U.S. at 428. The Court found that where a railroad worker
had brought an FELA action in a state court which was dismissed after the expiration of the
limitations period for improper venue, and the state had no transfer statute, the filing of the
original action tolled the limitations period. The Court expressly reasoned by analogy to the
disability exceptions, concluding that in "such cases a plaintiff has not slept on his rights but,
rather, has been prevented from asserting them." 380 U.S. at 429. Thus the need to ''vindicat[e] the plaintifl's rights" "outweighed" the "policy of repose." By contrast, where disability
does not explain the plaintiff's inaction, the policies behind her cause of action cannot weigh in
favor of tolling, for the limitations period itself embodies the judgment that after a fixed period
the repose interest outweighs the interests served by the cause of action.
27. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975); American Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974). One Supreme Court case arguably does not require
any affirmative policy reason to support tolling. In United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432

December 1982]

Statutes of Limitations

407

This policy calculus can assume several forms. 28 In the class action context, some courts appear willing to allow tolling whenever
this would not offend the policies behind statutes of limitations.29
Others appear to require satisfaction of the time bar policies and an
additional affirmative justification for tolling. 30 In the light ofAmeriU.S. 385 (1977), the Court considered how "timely" a motion for intervention had to be for the
purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.
A United Airlines stewardess had filed a sex discrimination charge, first with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, then in a federal district court. The court suit was
filed as a class action. The court denied certification of the class, but permitted additional
stewardesses to intervene. The court also certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) its denial of class certification. The Seventh Circuit refused to accept the appeal.
Eventually the original plaintiff and intervenors settled with the defendant, and hence, did not
make an appeal of right of the class certification denial. 432 U.S. at 387-89.
The plaintiff in McDonald, a former stewardess, attempted to intervene after the entry of
judgment. She sought intervention for the sole purpose of appealing the denial of class certification. 432 U.S. at 390.
As the McDonald dissent points out, her individual claim was barred at this point. Under
the American Pipe Rule, the statute of limitations started running after denial of class certification, and the statute had long since run. 432 U.S. at 397-98 (Powell, J., dissenting). The court,
however, considered her intervention "timely" for the purpose of the class denial appeal.
This result could be explained by mere satisfaction of the time bar policies. 432 U.S. at
394. The Court gives no additional, independant policy rationale for its decision. A rationale,
however, is buried in the footnotes. The Court noted that, in the Seventh Circuit, a class
action certification decision was not appealable as of right until after entry of the final judgment. 432 U.S. at 388 n.4. Defendants, after denial of class certification, would have a strong
incentive to settle with the original plaintiffs. By settling, they would avoid any appeal of the
class certification decision. If intervention by unrepresented class members were not allowed
after settlement, the certification decision would never be appealed. The unrepresented class
members, presumably many with claims too small to justify an individual action, would never
have a chance to contest the order. Thus, the McDonald case can be read as an attempt to
avoid the worst aspects of the Seventh Circuit's Rule. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that the
Court later adopted the same rule: plaintiffs cannot appeal as of right from a denial of class
certification before entry of a final judgment. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463
(1978). The Court later expressed a serious and well-founded concern for protecting the appeal of orders denying certification against the risk' of settlement with the named representatives. See Deposit Guar. Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("A district court's
ruling on the certification issue is often the most significant decision rendered in these classaction proceedings. To deny the right to appeal simply because the defendant has sought to
'buy off the individual private claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound
judicial administration.") (footnote omitted).
28. The courts have not developed any rigorous theoretical approach to limitations questions. Thus the standards discussed here describe the assumptions and resl!lts of courts taking
various approaches, but cannot be said to reflect any deliberate doctrinal differences.
29. A few cases in other class action tolling situations have examined limitations policies.
See McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269, 1273-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Haas v. Pittsburgh
Natl. Bank, 526 F.2d 1083, 1097 n.19 (3d Cir. 1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689,
696-97 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
30. See Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1030 ( 1966) ("After the statutory period has run the libellant has the burden of proving that
the delay has not prejudiced the respondent and that there is a good excuse to justify invocation of the doctrine.") (emphasis added); McMahon v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 297 F.2d
268, 270 (5th Cir. 1962) (libellant must show lack of prejudice and an excuse for the delay);
Comment, supra note 11, at 110-15 {policies behind statutes of limitations must be satisfied,
and the risk of American Pipe "multiplicity" problem must also be shown). For a case where
the court found a direct conflict between the statute of limitations policies and the class ac- .
tion's policies, but still allowed tolling, see Appleton Elec. Co., v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635
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can Pipe, some commentary has focused exclusively on the class action policies reflected in rule 23. 31
This Note argues that the appropriate standard requires the
plaintiff to establish that a tolling rule would not offend limitations
policies, and that an affirmative policy reason supports tolling the
statute. Mere satisfaction of the time b~r policies will not suffice,
because absent disability the policy interests underlying the cause of
action itself do not weigh in favor of tolling. 32 Given that the statutory bar presumptively applies after the expiration of the limitations
period, and that every tolling decision does at least marginal damage
to the policy interest in repose, the plaintiff cannot establish a
favorable policy balance without some independent justification.33
Sound theoretical considerations support this analytical framework,
and recent Supreme Court cases have consistently applied it.
In American Pipe, for example, the Court upheld tolling where
suspending the time bar would not offend the policy interests protected by the statute of limitations and would significantly advance
F.2d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981). See also International
Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 708 (1966) (tolling necessary to implement national policy of uniform time bars for Federal Employers' Liability Act action); Gonzalez v. Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir. 1977) ("[N]o overriding federal interest impels
us to toll the applicable statute of limitations in this case."); Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp.
261,272 (D. Md. 1974) (statute not tolled in the absence of clearly established authority); Note,
Class Actions- Tolling ofStatutes ofLimitations-Adequate Representation - Haas v. Pittsburgh Natl. Bank, 17 B.C. INous. & COM. L. REV. 915,917 (1976) {only toll statutes oflimita•
tions when a strong policy requires it); cf. Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947)
(statutes of limitations must be strictly adhered to by the judiciary). Where tolling would
violate the policies beh4td statutes of limitations, the policy reason would presumably have to
be stronger.
A line of cases implicitly relying on the absence of an affirmative justification for tolling
denies a plaintiff the benefit of tolling for the period of the pendency of an action dismissed
without prejudice and then refiled after the expiration of the limitations period. See Wheeler,
Predismissal Notice and Statutes of Limitations in Federal Class Actions After American Pipe
and Construction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL. L. REV 771, 775 (1975) (filing a law suit that is later
dismissed does not toll the statute of limitations for a subsequent action by the same persons
on the same cause of action). Cf. .Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note
20, at 1239 (would not allow amendment to the claim adding a new plaintiff after the statute of
limitations has run even if the defendant knew about the claim within the statutory period
because of suit brought by a joint plaintifl). Although these cases do not say that a strong
policy reason is necessary to toll the statute, these decisions are inconsistent with an analysis
focusing solely on policies behind statutes of limitations, since those policies were satisfied by
bringing the first suit. q. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974)
(policies behind statutes of limitations satisfied when representative of class brings suit; defendants notified of the essential information about the cause of action).
31. See Note, The American Pipe .Dream: Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 67
IOWA L. REV. 743, 752-58 (1982) (analysis of opt-out situation focusing solely on class action
policies); Comment, supra note 11, at 110-11 (any American Pipe analysis must also consider
the policies of tolling and statutes of limitations).
32. The judgment implicit in the statute is that after the limitations period expires the
defendant's interest in repose outweighs the plaintiff's interest in an adjudication on the merits;
in effect the plaintiff has waived her cause of action by sleeping on her rights. See note 26
supra.
33. See notes 42-44 in.fro and accompanying text.

December 1982]

Statutes of Limitations

409

the policy purposes of rule 23 class actions. Since the original class
action notified the defendant of the need to litigate, enforcing the
time bar would not have advanced the interests protected by the statute of limitations.34 Moreover, a decision not to toll the statute of
limitations would result in the filing of duplicative protective motions lest a subsequent denial of certification leave class members
without a remedy. 35 Given no reason not to toll, and a strong policy
interest favoring tolling, the Court held that the lapse of the original
limitations period did not bar intervention following the denial of
class status.
A similar analysis produced an opposite result in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency.36 There the Court held that the filing of an
administrative complaint before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not suspend the running of the limitations period applicable to a parallel discrimination claim brought under title
42 United States Code section 1981. The Court did not persuasively
advance, and the dissenters forcefully countered, the possibility that
tolling would result in actual prejudice to the defendant, given the
prior existence of a timely title VII claim.37 Rather, the Court relied
on the presumptive validity of a state statute of limitations expressly
borrowed by the federal statute conferring the right sued upon, and
the absence of any competing policy concern affirmatively favoring
tolling.38 The Johnson majority distinguished American Pipe be34. See 414 U.S. at 555 ("the imposition of a time bar would not in this circumstance
promote the purposes of the statute of limitations").
35. See 414 U.S. at 553-54. The Court later stated that the American Pipe decision protected the "litigatory efficiency served by class actions." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 465 n.21 (1975). Courts and co=entators have noted the strong emphasis
placed on this policy in American Pipe. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc.,
635 F.2d 603, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1980) (American Pipe implicitly said that the policies behind
class actions can overcome policies behind statutes of limitations; toll here to prevent protective motions making class action ineffective), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981); Case Note,
Antitrust Law- Class Actions - Tolling ofFederal Statutes of Limitations - American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1010, 1014 (1974) (American Pipe
emphasized economy and efficiency of class actions); Note, supra note 30, at 917 (strong policy
for tolling in American Pipe was litigative efficiency); Co=ent, supra note 11, at 108 (American Pipe was protecting the class action device).
36. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
37. The majority suggested that the administrative complaint would satisfy the policies
behind the statute of limitations only if "there is complete identity of the causes of action."
421 U.S. at 468 n.14. But givenfactual identity between claims, the defendant is notified of
both the relevant evidence that must be preserved and the prospect of litigation regarding the
circumstances that gave rise to both proceedings. See 421 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
38. 421 U.S. at 466 ("We .find no policy reason that excuses petitioner's failure to take the
minimal steps necessary to preserve each claim independently."). For the purposes of the
policy analysis contemplated here, it makes no difference whether the statute of limitations is
expressly provided by federal law as inAmerican Pipe, or is "borrowed" from state law, as in
Johnson. The interests protected are, of course, the same in both cases.
In Board of Regents of the Univ. of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1980),
the Court held that the federal courts must borrow state tolling rules along with the statute of
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cause in that case "there was a substantial body of relevant federal
procedural law to guide the decision to toll the limitation period, and
significant underlying federal policy that would have conflicted with
a decision not to suspend the running of the statute."39
Thus, the Court will approve tolling the statute of limitations
where such a rule will both conform to t~e policy purposes of the
time bar and serve important independent policy interests.40 The
Court will not approve tolling the statute where such a rule conforms
to the policy purposes of the time bar but does not serve important
independent policy interests. In a more recent opinion, the Court
made this decision rule explicit by declaring that a plaintiff's "failure
to comply with the New York statute of limitations (borrowed because the federal trial court sat in that state), therefore, precluded
maintenance of this action unless New York's tolling rule is 'inconsistent' with the policies underlying" the federal cause of action. 41
These decisions reflect justifiable deference to the legal force of
statutes of limitations and the purposes behind them. Regardless of
the circumstances, the judiciary should not disregard a statutory imlimitations when they rely on state law to fill a limitations void in federal law. In conjunction
with the court's conclusion in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980), that
there is no "direct collision" between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the commencement of actions and a state's tolling provisions, this might suggest a different Rule for
limitations statutes borrowed from the states. Two considerations render this possibility remote. First, the Court in Tomanio expressly indicated that in a conflict with federal policy the
state tolling rules must yield. 446 U.S. at 485. Walker was a diversity case where deference to
state rules is incomparably greater than when those rules are relevant only by the force of
federal law. The policies behind rule 23 thus weigh in the policy balance whether the repose
interest is protected by a rule of state or federal origin. q: Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (in direct conflict with state rules, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will prevail even in
diversity cases). Second, the state tolling provisions will almost surely not speak to the case of
an opt-out plaintiff in a federal class action, and deference to them will therefore not resolve
the federal procedural question of whether such plaintiffs should benefit from the tolling of the
limitations period by the filing of the class action.
39. 421 U.S. at 466 (footnote omitted). The Court also pointed out that the American Pipe
statute was purely a creature of federal law, and that the subsequent claim asserted there was
indistinguishable from the original class action.
40. Even where the Court tolls a statute, it always considers whether the limitations policies are met. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 392-95 (1971);American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55; Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428-30 (1965).
In theory, tolling might be required by compelling policy considerations even where the time
bar policies would be violated, such as where disability prevents legal action before the expiration of the limitations period, so that honoring the limitations policies would completely sacrifice interests protected by the substantive law. There is a dearth of authority, however,
supporting tolling in violation of limitations policies absent some such dramatic countervailing
interest. But see note 30 supra (case cited tolled to serve American Pipe policies even though
tolling violated time bar policies).
Requiring satisfaction of limitations policies could be problematic. Legislatures often
adopt time bars without considering or reconsidering the purposes the bars are to serve. See
.Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, supra note 20, at I 185. In spite of this,
courts have been consistently able to identify the major time bar policies. See notes 48-49, 59
infta and accompanying text.
41. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added).

December 1982]

Statutes of Limitations

411

perative without good reason. 42 Similarly, absent an affirmative justification, the courts should avoid relying on the problematic inquiry
into whether a prior legal proceeding adequately warns a party to
prepare the defense of an untimely but related action, since that inquiry inherently runs the risk of prejudicing the defendant. 43 Moreover, every tolling decision casts doubt on the settled expectations of
potential defendants, expectations perhaps made more rather than
less important by involvement in recent litigation related to the
claim allowed by tolling.44 In short, both theory and authority impose the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff requesting tolling, and
only an unequivocal showing of a favorable policy outcome will
carry that burden.
This standard assumes crucial importance where an opted-out
class member wishes to bring suit. As Part II demonstrates, tolling in
such cases often does not clearly offend the policies underlying stat42. This standard is consistent with the maxim that statutes of limitations are to be strictly
enforced. See Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535,539 (1947) (Statutes of limitation "are established to cut off rights, justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted and they must be
strictly adhered to by the judiciary. . . . Remedies for resulting inequities are to be provided
by Congress, not by the courts.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Hall v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358, 360-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (power to create tolling exceptions
judicially is limited by the general rule that when a statute of limitations exists, it acts as a total
bar; there is a strong congressional policy favoring repose in antitrust suits). This maxim, if
applied absolutely, would never admit tolling. Still, it does suggest that courts should pay great
deference to the limitation enacted by the legislature.
43. A particular defendant might have had notice of the claim before filing, and so not
have a repose interest. But tolling on this ground would pose two troublesome questions to
potential defendants. First, what constitutes "notice" could be difficult to define. In Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Supreme Court questioned whether a title
VII race discrimination claim provided notice to the defendant of a later race discrimination
claim filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The majority concluded that "[o]nly where there is complete identity of the causes of action will the protections suggested [notice to defendant of the
claim] . . . necessarily exist . . . ." 421 U.S. at 467 n.14 (emphasis added). Three dissenters
felt notice sufficient, given that the defendant was aware of the "grievance," when the separate
claims "arise out of the same factual situation." 421 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Second, whether this "notice" is sufficient to satisfy the limitations policies can also prove problematic. Compare 421 U.S. at 467 n.14 (need identical claims
for court to assess influence on repose interest of defendant), with 421 U.S. at 475-76 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (time bar policies satisfied "since the claims
are essentially equivalent in substance").
If the tolling inquiry were limited to satisfaction of limitations policies, defendants would
only be protected by these problematic distinctions.
44. See notes 55-59 infra and accompanying text. Any tolling doctrine, no matter how
narrow, will marginally decrease the certainty provided by time bars. A defendant might be
sued long after a tort, for example, where the victim was an infant at the time of the tort. See
notes 20-21 supra.
Experience with the magnitude of potential liability in class actions might well intensify
the interest of potential defendants in expecting freedom from litigation - and its expenses protected by the statute of limitations. Notice of one suit simply does not satisfy the right of
potential defendants not to bear the burdens and uncertainties of litigation after the expiration
of the statutory period. See .Developments in the Law: Statutes ofLimitations, supra note 20, at
1185 (defendant should be secure in the reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped
clean of ancient obligations); Special Project, supra note 11, at 1089 ("Predicability is the key
to fulfillment of the policies embodied in statutes of limitations.").
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utes of limitations.45 The opted-out plaintiff, however, cannot show
any additional reason favoring tolling. 46 The decision rule alone can
determine this particular tolling decision.

IL

APPLICATION OF THE TOLLING STANDARD

Application of this analysis to the opted-out plaintiff demonstrates that courts should not toll the statute oflimitations.47 Though
tolling will not violate the time bar policies, the plaintiff cannot assert any independent reason in support of tolling. This Part will first
examine the underlying limitations policies, and then analyze these
policies in the opt-out context. The last section will then scrutinize
rationales advanced to support tolling.
A. Statutes of Limitations Purposes
The basic policy of statutes of limitations is fairness to the defendant.48 This policy has two distinct components. First, the statute
protects the fair adjudication of the claim by ensuring notice of the
need to defend against it.49 The statute prevents "surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber." 50 Through
prompt filing of a claim, the plaintiff informs the defendant of the
necessity of preserving evidence. 51 Without this notice, the defendant must bear the excessive costs, of preserving evidence, or must
defend after "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappear~d." 52 This element of fairness also relieves
45. See notes 60-71 infra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 72-151 infra and accompanying text.
47. Courts tolling for opt-out plaintiffs do not seem to engage in any structured analysis.
See cases cited in note 15 supra. They might agree that a strong policy reason need be shown,
but they apparently assume the American Pipe policies apply. In following the analysis developed in Part I, this Note will probe this assumption.
48. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977); Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965); Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 347 (5th
Cir. 1981); Eastridge v. Fruehauf Corp., 52 F.R.D. 129, 131 (W.D. Ky. 1971); United States v.
Vibradamp Corp., 257 F. Supp. 931, 939-40 (S.D. Cal. 1966); J)evelopmenls in the Law: Slalules of Limitations, supra note 20, at 1185; Special Project, supra note 11, at 1084.
49. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (unjust not to put
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation); Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Rosling,
360 F.2d 926, 927 (2d Cir. 1966) (defendant had timely notice of alleged dereliction); Special
Project, supra note 11, at 1017.
50. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944);
see American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d
726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478
F.2d 979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
51. See D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904,908 (1st Cir. 1958) (notice given
to defendant as warning to preserve evidence); Hodges v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 268, 270
(Ct. Cl. 1953) (apprise defendant of the necessity of keeping records and witnesses).
52. Order ofR. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (spare defendant the burden of defense after evidence is
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the courts of "the burden of trying stale claims."53 Courts sometimes
speak of this interest in procedural fairness as the only purpose of
statutes of limitations,54 and in any given case it may be the most
important. But the limitation of actions also protects the interests of
those not parties to a particular suit.
The second component of the fairness interest advanced by statutes of limitations involves the interest of potential defendants in the
expectation of freedom from litigation.55 This is the "repose interest." At its core is the notion that the passage of time confers legitimacy on legal relationships, and that within reasonable limits the
law should seek to bring "security and stability to human affairs" 56
by insulating the fruits of past conduct from legal interference. 57
The classic illustration of legal respect for the repose interest is the
doctrine of adverse possession.58
gone); Homey v. United States, 536 F.2d 360, 364 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976)
(spare defendant after memories had faded); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator
Constructors, 449 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (protect defendant from defending
after evidence is lost).
Such burdens would unfairly hinder the defense. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 473 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965); see United States v. Western P.R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,314 (1945);
Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Luckenbach S.S.
Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1963).
This policy is balanced by the need to give plaintiffs adequate time to vindicate their rights.
See text at note 25 supra.
54. The assumption in cases like American Pipe and Burnett is that notice to the particular
defendant satisfies all of the policies behind limitations statutes.
55. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 334 (1978); El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497,516 (1965); Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482,485 (1947); Shepherd
v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231, 235 (1887); Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 675-76 (2d Cir.
1977); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); G. NEWSOM & L. ABEL-SMITH, PRESTON AND NEWSOM ON LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 2-3 (3d ed. 1953)
(long dormant claims have more cruelty than justice in them); H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 8 (4th ed. 1916) (statutes of limitation are
statutes of repose); Special Project, supra note 11, at 1016 (protects defendant's reasonable
expectations and repose).
Justice Holmes has presented a common sense foundation for the repose interest:
[T]he foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in the
position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser. . . • A thing which you
have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes
root in your being and cannot be tom away without your resenting the act and trying to
defend yourself, however you came by it The law can ask no better justification than the
deepest instincts of man.
Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,477 (1897).
56. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
51. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385,401 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(promote repose by giving security and stability); H. WooD, supra note 55, at 9 (statutes of
limitations are essential to ·security).
For the statutes to have these salutary effects, some degree of certainty is needed. Little
stability is gained if time bars could be easily avoided. See note 44 supra.
58. See Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 476-77 (1831) ("Statutes of limitations have
been emphatically and justly denominated statutes of repose. . • • This remark is peculiarly
applicable to land titles.").
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Although somewhat amorphous, the repose interest has a place
in any accurate account of t~e fundamental values underlying statutes of limitations:
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that
.the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the
right to prosecute them. 59

Both of these interests deserve consideration in determining the consistency of a decision to toll with the functional purposes of the statute of limitations.

B. Limitations Policies and the Opt-Out Plaintiff
Tolling the statute for one who opts out of an ongoing class action will typically not violate these policies because the original class
action ensures that the defendant has notice of the claims against
~~~~~a~~~~~~~~~fy~~~

the trial court already has certified the class. 61 In certifying the class,
the judge must have found that the class representatives' claims "are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class," 62 that "questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate,"63 and
that the representatives will "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."64 These findings inform the defendants of the
claims made on behalf of class members, including those members
who later opt out.65
Nor does tolling force a defendant to incur excessive costs in preparing a defense against the opt-out plaintiff. The defendant already
has to locate witnesses, revive memories, and find evidence to defend
the class suit. 66 The separate suit filed after the opt-out would use
the same witnesses and evidence.67 While tolling would create some
additional costs in the preservation and use of evidence at a second
59. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) (emphasis added).
60. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553-55 (1974) (defendant has
notice even when class certification denied).
61. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
62. Feo. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(3).
63. Feo. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3).
64. Feo. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(4).
65. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974).
66. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (suit with intervenors after class status denied would involve the same memories, witnesses, and subject matter as the original suit and is fair to the defendant). CJ.' Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U.S. 547, 554 (1910) (proceeding for a reassessment
was not a new action and is therefore not subject to the operation of the statute of limitations).
61. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 562 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (suit with intervenors after class status denied would involve the same memories,
witnesses, and subject matter as the original suit and is fair to the defendant).
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trial, these costs would not be oppressively excessive.68
A similar analysis applies to the repose interest. Class certification informs the defendant "of the number and generic identities of
the potential plaintiffs . . . ." 69 More particularly, the defendant
cannot assume the opt-out plaintiff will not sue. Between the class
action filing and the class member's opt out, the defendant must assume that he will have to defend against all class members.70 Since
the original class action notifies the defendant of the collective claim
against him, he has no reason to expect complete security against the
lesser included claim of the individual who chooses to opt out. And
so long as potential defendants may rely on security against claims
they have no reason to know about, a decision to permit tolling for
claims of which the defendant has timely notice will not cast unreasonable doubt on the stability of legal relationships. Tolling for the
opt-out plaintiff therefore appears consistent with the purposes of the
time bar.71 As developed in Part I, however, this of itself does not
68. It is arguable that the policies behind statutes of limitations are violated here because
the defendant has a repose interest in not having to defend a greater number of suits and that
the tremendous cost of a second suit does create excessive evidence costs for the defendant.
However, this Note assumes that the policies behind the statutes of limitations are not violated
for two reasons. First, this assumption presents the best case for the argument that the statute
should be tolled. Without this assumption, the policy of repose would be violated and the
plaintiff would have to show an even stronger policy reason to justify tolling. Even with this
assumption this Note will show that the statute should not be tolled. Second, this assumption
is more consistent with the Court's discussion of statutes of limitations inAmerican Pipe. See
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974) (limitations policies satisfied when the defendant has notice of the claims and potential plantiffs).
69. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974).
70. See .Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1451 (defendant faced
with information about potential liability to the class cannot be said to have reached a state of
repose that should be protected). Suspending the statute during this time would not violate the
defendant's repose interest even if there were a long time left after the tolling stopped. The
suspension adds the same amount of time to the statutory period for bringing suit whether it
occurs near the end of the period or in the middle. When the reason for tolling ceases to exist,
the statute starts running again for whatever time it has left. This is no different than tolling
for the length of a plaintiff's disability. See notes 20-21 supra. q: note 68 supra (,tl.merican
Pipe assumed no repose interest when class certification denied).
71. The only problematic time bar policy is the incentive to file early. (See Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (statute runs on those who have slept on their
rights); Wood v. Carpenter, IOI U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (time bars "punish negligence"); H.
Wooo, supra note 55, at 9-10; see also text at note 25 supra. In American Pipe, the Court
apparently thought this policy served if the defendant had adequate notice:
The policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and of barring a plaintiff who
"has slept on his rights" are satisfied when, as here, a named plaintiff who is found to be
representative of a class commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants not only of
the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic
identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment. Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation . . . .
414 U.S. at 554-55 (1974) (citation omitted). The reasoning seems to be that since the class
representative filed on time; the intervenors in this action are also timely as the defendant had
notice of their claims. In the opt-out situation, where the class is certified, a similar argument
can be made. The class representative filed a timely claim. The class was certified "as soon as
practicable." The plaintiff then opted out within the time set by the court. Since th.: defendant
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suffice to justify suspending the limitations period.
C. Independent Reasons for Tolling
To justify tolling, the opt-out plaintiff still must establish an affirmative policy reason favoring suspension of the statute. After examining possible rationales, this section concludes that the plaintiff
cannot show such a reason.
The policies of the statute upon which the plaintiff sues offer one
possible reason for tolling.72 For example, the plaintiff might argue
that the interest in enforcing the antitrust laws justifies tolling. This
rationale does not suffice. First, whether this particular plaintiff sues
or not, the original class action will vindicate the statutory purpose; a
violation of the statute will not go unpunished.73 Second, the plaintiff can still satisfy her claim, and hence the statutory policy, within
the class action.74 Refusing to toll does not prevent the plaintiff from
enforcing the statute, but rather limits the forum in which she can
proceed.75 Third, whatever the social benefits of prosecuting the
claim, the plaintiff has lost her individual right to sue due to the
passage of time. Every meritorious action vindicates some important
policy; every plaintiff could assert this policy as justifying an extension. Statutes of limitations, however, "are established to cut off
rights, justifiable or not, that might otherwise be asserted . . . ." 76
The filing of a class action did not prevent the plaintiff from filing
her own suit.77 Absent infancy, insanity, imprisonment, war, death,
had notice of the claim from the beginning, and the opt-out plaintiff followed the rule 23
procedures promptly, arguably the "incentive to suit" policy is satisfied. The policy is satisfied
at least to the extent it was in American Pipe. Given this reasoning, the opt-out plaintiff can
demonstrate that the purposes of the limitations statute will not be violated by tolling. See
.Developments in the Law- ClassActions,supra note 8, at 1449-50 (tolling not limited to those
who were actually relying on the class action because among other reasons, notice protects the
interests of the defendant).
An analogy can be made to amendments to the pleadings which relate back to the date of
filing because the defendant has notice of the nature of the amended claim. See .Developments
in the Law- Class Actions,supra note 8, at 1451-53.
72. See note 26 supra.
73. The actions of the plaintiffs who remain in the class and the opted-out plaintiff concern
predominately common questions. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3).
74. Instead of opting out, the plaintiff could enter an appearance, intervene in the action,
or file a motion for subclassing. See notes 101-13 infra and accompanying text. All of these
measures give the plaintiff some measure of control in the action. The plaintiff could also
remain a passive class member, and let others prosecute the claim. Given the desire to opt out,
the other options would probably be more satisfying.
75. The plaintiff would be forced to proceed in the forum of the class action, and would
have less control of the suit then she would in a private action. q: notes 101-13 infra and
accompanying text (methods for class member to take a more active role in the prosecution of
the class suit).
76. Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) (restating maxim that judges must strictly
adhere to statutes of limitations).
77. Opting out prevents the class action judgment from binding the self-excluded class
members. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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or fraudulent concealment,78 the courts were open to the plaintiff
and filing an action was not beyond her control. Thus, while the
underlying right of action might itself justify tolling for a plaintiff
who without fault was unable to file a timely claim, it cannot justify
tolling for an opt-out plaintiff who has slept on her private rights for
the duration of the limitations period.
The plaintiff might argue that lack of knowledge of the right to
sue is a disability justifying tolling. She could contend that the statute should be tolled until she became aware of the cause of action.
This is no excuse, in the absence of fraudulent concealment, for failing to file a timely action.79 Especially if a large claim is at stake, 80
the plaintiff cannot claim that the harm was too trivial to·. investigate.81 The barring of a lawsuit in this case does not differ from the
enforcement of any other time bar. 82 The plaintiff, then, must look
to the policies reflected in the class action procedure to justify tolling
the statute.
78. If any of these disabilities are present, the court, of course, should suspend the statute
for the duration of the disability. See notes 20-21 supra.
19. See, e.g., Premium Management, Inc. v. Walker, 648 F.2d 778, 781 (1st Cir. 1981)
(ordinary ignorance of cause of action is not a reason to toll); Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1975) (will not toll if just ignorant of the law or of the
existence of the cause of action); Hart v. First Natl. Bank, 373 F.2d 202, 208 (5th Cir. 1967)
(ignorance of cause of action is not enough to toll); Harper v. Harper, 252 F. 39, 43 (4th Cir.
1918) (mere lack of knowledge of actionable wrong does not suspend statute of limitations);
French v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 88 F. Supp. 714, 723 (D.N.J. 1950) (mere ignorance that one has a cause of action or of facts giving rise to a cause of action not sufficient to
toll).
80. One who opts out of a class action to bring her own suit must have a large claim to
make the huge costs of a separate action worthwhile.
81. The size of the claim should also provide a strong incentive to file on time.
American Pipe extended tolling even to those unaware of the class action. See 414 U.S.
538, 551-52 (1974). Possibly the Court reasoned that many of these class members would have
claims too trivial to investigate, or to file a separate action. Tolling for these small claimants
would further the policy behind rule 23 of vindicating the rights of all who are victimized. See
note 89 infra. These claimants, after the denial of certification, could then still avail themselves of the relatively inexpensive intervention option. This policy is of little relevance to the
opt-out situation, where only those with large claims would go to the expense of separate suits.
82. Some statutes of limitations expressly provide that the statute will not start to run until
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered her cause of action, see, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-584 (1981), but these are the exceptions. A statute that begins to run when the
cause of action accrues makes the plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the cause of action irrelevant. The legislature made a choice by adopting a statute that runs with the accrual of the
action 7ather than when the plaintiff discovers the cause of action.
It might be harder for a plaintiff to discover that he or she has been illegally harmed by an
economic crime such as an antitrust violation, but the solution for this is to have Congress
adopt a different kind of statute of limitations. Congress did adopt a special statute of limitations in antitrust actions under the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976) (statute of limitations tolled during pendency of government suit and one year thereafter). The plaintiff is
allowed to discover his or her cause of action by learning of the government suit and is then
allowed one year after the outcome is known to bring his or her own suit.
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REFUSING To TOLL AND AMERICAN PIPE

An opt-out plaintiff might assert a final reason for tolling: suspension of the time bar furthers the rule 23 class action policies. In
American Pipe, the Supreme Court tolled to preserve the efficiency
of the class action procedure. 83 Some courts have apparently construed the decision to require tolling in all class action situations, 84 a
tendency reinforced by the Eisen dicta. A plaintiff, pointing to the
broad language of those decisions, would argue that a refusal to toll
would lead to the unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions that so concerned the American Pipe Court. 85
This Part analyzes the effect of tolling on the class action policies
protected by American Pipe. It concludes that not only do class action policies fail to justify tolling, but tolling would conflict with the
basic purposes of the class action procedure. Opt-out plaintiffs who
wish to toll the statute of limitations, then, face a final barrier to suit:
tolling would give rise to the very problems that American Pipe
sought to prevent.
A.

Class Action Policies

The fundamental objectives of class actions are to promote judicial economy and to prevent inconsistent adjudications. 86 The procedure promotes economies of time, effort, and expense by resolving
the claims of an entire class in one lawsuit. Class actions promote
uniformity of decision by binding all members of the class to the
final judgment.87 Without this procedure, courts would waste time
and resources deciding the same issues on the same evidence in
many separate actions; 88 moreover these separate actions create the
83. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
84. See cases cited in notes 15-16, 19 supra.
85. See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551-54; Note, supra note 20, at 756-58.
86. The rules committee's note to rule 23 states: "Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those
cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee
note on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 73, 102-03 (1966). See American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550-56 (1974); New York v. General Motors Corp., 60
F.R.D. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 489-92 (N.D. Ill. 1969); American Trading &
Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 458-60 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Fischer v. Kletz, 41
F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS§ l 160(i) (1977);
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1754 (1972); Kaplan,
Continuing Work ofthe Civil Commitlee: 1966 Amendments ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I}, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,390 (1967).
81. See text at note 9 supra.
88. Many separate actions would be unavoidable. To qualify as a class suit, the class must
be "so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable .•.." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(l).
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possibility of inconsistent adjudications. 89
Basic principles of fairness, however, constrain the pursuit of judicial efficiency. Rule 23 incorporates various safeguards to protect
the interests of class members, including the opt-out provision itself.90 If tolling is essential to the fair adjudication of individual
claims, then a sound reason may support suspending the limitations
period, quite independently of the efficiency concerns so prominent
in American Pipe.
B.

Class Actions and the Opt-Out Plaint!ff

The best argument for the opt-out plaintiff is that class members
are not only interested in whether the class is certified, but also in
how the class is certified.91 The trial court may grant certification
89. The class action procedure also serves other purposes not relevant to the tolling problem. First, it protects large groups of plaintiffs who are harmed by a similar wrong but whose
injuries are too small to justify individual actions. See Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578
F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (providing a forum for plaintiffs with small claims is a purpose of class
actions), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 445 :U.S. 940 (1980); Klenk & Kelly, Rule 23
(1966) Purposes & Prerequisites, in CLASS ACTIONS 2-1, [2-9 to 2-11] (Illinois Institute For
Continuing Legal Education ed. 1974) (forum for small claimants is a purpose of class actions); 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160(h) (one of the purposes of rule 23 is providing a
forum for small plaintiffs); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1754, at 543 (protecting small claimant is an objective of rule 23). Second, class actions help in vindicating statutory policies. Actions creating harm that is widespread and so causes only slight individual
injunes would not be deterred without the class action device making aggregate enforcement
suits feasible. See Klenk & Kelly, supra, at [2.6]; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160(k);
Developments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1373.
Since only plaintiffs with relatively large sums at stake would consider opting out, see note
80 supra, these concerns do not effect the tolling question.
90. The Advisory Committee Notes are replete with references to "measures which can be
taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions." FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes
on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D 69, 99 (1966). Rule 23(b)(3) actions, for example,
must not sacrifice "procedural fairness." FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on 1966
amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory
committee notes on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966) (subdivision d "is
concerned with the fair and efficient conduct of the action"). The Committee ensured fairness
by, for example, requiring notice to class members in (b)(3) actions, see id. at 107, and making
notice available in (b)(l) and (b)(2) actions. FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on
1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (1966).
91. TheAmerican Pipe Court hinted at this when it said: "Not until the existence and limits
of the class have been established . . . does a class member have any duty to take note of the
suit or to exercise any responsibility with respect to it in order to profit from the eventual outcome of the case." 414 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added). Arguably this passage allows class
members to sit and wait until the certification decision; the decision to file separately could be
postponed until then. A commentator, who favors tolling, disposes of this particular pro-tolling position:
A weakness with this argument is that when the Court stated that putative members need
not take note of the suit until certification, the Court was anticipating that after certification the members y.,ould participate as class members rather than opt out. The putative
members therefore were regarded as passive beneficiaries. Members opting out, however,
are not passive beneficiaries of the class. They intend to exercise their rights independent
of the class action and arguably they should exercise those rights independent of the benefits that the passive beneficiaries receive.
Note, supra note 20, at 756 (footnotes omitted).
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pursuant to various orders and conditions92 which may be crucial to
the opt-out decision. Limits may be imposed on the variety of legal
theories available to the class representative,93 for example, or alternatively, the certification process might raise doubts among some
class members as to the adequacy of class representation.94 The class
representative might even reach a tentative partial or full settlement,
on behalf of the class, with the defendant prior to certification. 95 A
class member disappointed by this settlement might want to preserve
the option of a separate suit until the court decides the certification
question and issues an appropriate order.96 In the absence of tolling,
individual actions could become time-barred during the certification
period.97
This raises two possibilities. On the one hand, class members
might be unfairly denied their individual rights by being forced to
92. Rule 23(d) gives the district court wide discretion to control the class action suit. The
court "may make appropriate orders . . . imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors . . . ." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(3).
93. q: .Developments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1479-80 (arguing that
courts may be in error if they allow a case to proceed with conflicting legal theories),
94. See Note, supra note 20, at 756-57.
95. See 5 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5570c (1977). One court suggested that it is highly desirable for the trial judge to designate the class representative to
conduct settlement negotiations. See Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30,
33 (3d Cir. 1971).
As a practical matter, if the defendant reached a satisfactory settlement with the class representative, the defendant would see no need to contest the class certification decision. Absent
any other safeguards, see notes 101-13 infra and accompanying text, only the vigilance of the
court protects the putative class members from an unjust certification or inadequate settlement.
Other conditions might also be imposed pursuant to certification. Intervention might be
limited. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(3); Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 385 F.2d 122, 123 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 995 (1968) (not abuse of discretion to impose a time limit for
possible intervention). Courts, however, are restrained in the limits they can impose on intervention. Intervention is of right if the class representative inadequately protects the intervenor's interest. See notes 103-04 infra and accompanying text. Courts also have an interest in
granting intervention. See text at note 106 infra. Finally, even if intervention is denied, class
members can always make an appearance. See text at notes 108-10 infra. These safeguards
serve to minimize any potential distress about restrictions on intervention in certification orders.
In some cases brought under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-9lf (1976), the
certification order will restrict the monetary damages available to class members. A statutory
formula limits the damages in class suits. Individuals filing separate suits could usually recover more than that available as a pro rata share of the class judgment. See, e.g., Brame v.
Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568, 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). This certification restriction is not
crucial to the opt-out decision. Putative class members who know of the class action will immediately file suits to avoid the class action monetary limit. They will always file suits to
preserve the greater individual recoveries. How the class is certified is unimportant; if the class
is certified, the statutory limit is mandatory. Because it is mandatory, individuals have no
interest in waiting to see how the class is certified in order to make the opt-out decision.
96. But cf. note 128 infra (This "sideline sitting" is analogous to the "one-way intervention" that 1966 amendments to rule 23 specifically tried to eliminate.),
97. The class certification process can take years. See Mills v. The Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
No. 63 C 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (class upheld after 107 months, 26 days); Zolotnitzky v.
Yablok, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Victorian Investors v.-Responsive Envts.
Corp., 56 F.R.D. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class upheld 33 months after suit was filed).
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remain in the class action. On the other, they might file protective
motions and claims to preserve a meaningful opt-out opportunity. 98
These filings would all be superfluous if, after certification, the class
members decided to remain in the class action. In short, tolling
might avoid precisely the "multiplicity of activity'' 99 which the American Pipe Court tried to prevent. The procedural safeguards incorporated in rule 23, however, minimize both of these dangers.
1) Fairness

A number of considerations suggest that tolling is not required to
protect the rights of individual class members. Because the court
retains the flexibility to alter or amend the certification order at any
time before the decision on the merits, 100 class members can attempt
to cure the defects in the order rather than going to the trouble and
expense of a private action. Class action procedures make use of this
flexibility by providing several methods to protect the interests of
individual class members. 101
First, the class member may "intervene"; 102 that is, the member
can join the named representatives in court to prosecute the class
suit. Intervention ensures that the interests of all members are protected, even if the representative fails to defend them. Intervention is of right if the class representative inadequately protects
the intervenor's interest; 103 otherwise, it is at the court's discretion. 104
98. See Note, supra note 20, at 757-58.
99. 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1976). Note these claims and motions are unnecessary only if the
class member decides to remain in the class action. If the class member decides to pursue a
separate action, she must file a claim.
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l). Orders entered under authority of subdivision (d) "may be
altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d).
IOI. See generally 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY,supra note 7, ~~ 23.07 [I], at 23-213, 23.45
[4.-5) at 23-394 (if court finds claims not adequately represented it can redefine the class,
subclass, or allow intervention); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1765 (1972 &
Supp. 1982); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1793 (1972 & Supp. 1982) (methods to make representation adequate).
102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2), 24. These two rules should be harmonized in their
application to class actions. The right to intervene is placed in the class action rule to ensure
an opportunity for each view to be heard. See 1A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86,
§ 1799, at 253.
For discussions of how intervention is used in class actions, see 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 7, ~ 23.90[2]; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799; JJevelopments in the Law: Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1482-85; Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of
Class Actions: A Consideration ofSubdivision (d}, IO B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 577, 583-89
(1969). lntervenors in class suits are not barred by the statute of limitations. See American
Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551 ("commencement of the [class] action satisified the purpose of the limitation provision as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit") (emphasis added).
103. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides for intervention of right
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
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Courts allow intervention liberally to achieve class action objectives.105 By granting a motion for intervention, the court both obtains fresh insight into the composition of class interests and protects
the final judgment from attack on due process grounds because of
inadequate representation. 106 Intervention, then, can serve to vindicate the rights of those who would otherwise feel a need to opt
out.101
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
In the class certification proceedings, the court determines whether the named plaintiffs "will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(4); see text at
note 64 supra. A class member seeking intervention of right would alert the court that some
class interests were overlooked in the certification process, and would give the court an opportunity to correct the oversight. See notes 105-06 infra and accompanying text.
104. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides for permissive intervention:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (I) when a
statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an appli•
cant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.
When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon
any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute
or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to
intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.
In application, this rule should be harmonized with rule 23(d)(2). Rule 23(d)(2) provides
that the court "may make appropriate orders:"
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some
or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment,
or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair
and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the
action.
FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(2).
105. See 1A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799, at 254; lJevelopmen/s in //,e
Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1485 & n.164.
106. See generally 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 7, ~ 23.07(1], at 23-199;
Klenk & Kelly, supra note 89, § 2.~8.
Since class action~ only bind absentee members whose interests have been adequately represented, Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961), courts have a
strong incentive to ensure this adequacy. If the representation is later declared inadequate, the
efficiency and uniformity of adjudication goals of the class action procedure, see text at notes
86-89 supra, are not attainable. The absentee class members would be free to bring individual
suits, with all the waste ofjudicial resources and possibility ofinconsistent results that implies.
The Fifth Circuit has gone a step further to ensure adequacy of representation. They require counsel for plaintiff to report problems with the adequacy of representation to the court.
See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176-78 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). A plaintiff who was willing to opt out of the class and bring her
own suit would, if she stayed in the class action, probably ensure that the court knew about
inadequate representation of her interests.
107. A court may restrict or impose conditions on intervention. See note 95supra. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(3) allows the court to permit or restrict intervention to whatever
level will adequately represent all of the class interests and still allow for the efficient prosecution of the suit. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799, at 258. Because of
the important due process and notice to the court aspects of intervention, however, courts
should start with a presumption in favor of intervention. Id. at 254; lJevelopmenls in //,e Law
- Class Actions, supra note.8, at 1484-85.
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Second, the class member has the right to make an "appearance"
after certification. 108 T~ough not well defined, it allows the member
to receive copies of all papers :filed with the court and gives the plaintiff formal representation for tactical purposes. 109 The plaintiff, kept
abreast of all developments in the suit, can judge if her interests are
being adequately protected. If they are not she can inform the
judge. 110
Finally, if a large number of class members have differing interests, the court can split the class into subclasses 111 or maintain the
suit as a partial class action. 112 The court can also direct notice to
class members so that they may express their views on the adequacy
of representation. 11 3
These procedures allow class members to cure defects in certification orders in a relatively inexpensive manner. If the court imposes
limits on the legal theories of relief to prevent conflicts in the class, a
disgruntled class member can petition for subclassing. 114 Each subBy giving the court this insight, intervention enables "those class members on the outside of
the litigation to function as effective watchdogs to make certain that the action is fully and
fairly conducted." 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1799, at 252.
108. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2)(C) provides that "any member who does not request exclusion [from the class] may, ifhe desires, enter an appearance through his counsel." The plaintiff
does not have to show inadequate representation in order to enter an appearance. 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, at§ 4140;see 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,supra note 86, § 1799, at 25558.
109. See Newberg, supra note 102, at 588 (discussion of policy considerations in defining
the scope of an "appearance").
110. If in fact interests are not adequately protected, she can intervene as of right. See text
at note 103 supra.
111. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(B); 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1120g; Developments
in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1479-82 ("Subclassing provides . . . a means of
increasing the reliability of party representation of absentee interests by, in effect, adding additional parties to the lawsuit who more accurately reflect in their own interests the interests of
discrete groups of absentees.") (id. at 1479). Under rule 23, each subclass is treated as a class,
with the rest of the rule's requirements applied accordingly. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(B). See
Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1980) (denial of subclass certification), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511
F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1975) (each subclass must meet the rule 23 prerequisites).
Subclassing is required when the plaintiff class has diverse interests, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975), or when different
class members seek different remedies. See, e.g., Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d
1197, 1200-01 (6th Cir. 1974). When the named representatives do not adequately represent
the class, the court must take measures such as subclassing or decertification. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419,423 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 451
U.S. 902 (1981).
112. "[A]n action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues. . . ." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(A); see 1A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86,
§ 1790. This procedure resolves common issues in the class action, leaving the rest for individual suits.
113. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(2).
114. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1011 (1975); Green v. Sante Fe Indus., 88 F.R.D. 575, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Vuyanich v.
Republic Natl. Bank of Dallas, 78 F.R.D. 352, 356 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Developments in the Law
- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1479-82.
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class would then assert separate claims, a result which would preserve all tenable theories without opting out. If doubts exist as to the
adequacy of representation, the plaintiff can move to intervene. In
all of these situations, the trial court would have a strong incentive to
modify its original certification order. By modifying the order, ensuring that the class action suit accurately reflects all the class interests, the court protects the final judgment from attack on due process
grounds. 115
The court can also ensure that any proposed settlement is in the
interests of all class members. 116 Under rule 23, "[a] class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."117 In reviewing the settlement, the district court "must carefully consider certain factors and comply with certain procedural
safeguards to ensure that the settlement is in the interests of the class,
does not unfairly impinge on the rights and interests of dissenters,
I 15. See generally note 106 supra; Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1058
(5th Cir. 1979) (binding effect of class judgment on absentee members depends on the adequacy of representation in the class suit).
I 16. The fear of an inadequate settlement is crucial to the tolling question only when the
settlement is reached prior to, or shortly after, class certification. If a settlement is reached
long after certification, the class members can no longer opt out, see note 8 supra, so tolling is
irrelevant. If a class member with a large claim does fear an inadquate settlement, there seems
to be little reason for her to delay filing her individual claim. While delay allows her to evaluate the certification process before making the decision to file separately, it does nothing to
protect her from an inadequate settlement long after certification.
117. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(e). This rule does not apply until an action has been certified as a
"class action" under rule 23(c)(l). Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1303-04 (4th Cir.
1978); Weight Watchers of Philadelphia v. Weight Watchers Intl., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir.
1973); see Wheeler, supra note 30, at 775 n.16a. Contra Duncan v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 66 F.R.D. 615, 616 {E.D. Wis. 1975).
The problem of pre-certification settlements has two aspects. First, a class representative
might negotiate a settlement of his individual claim and seek dismissal of the class action allegations in the complaint. Putative class members who relied on the class action filing to vindicate their rights might now be time-barred. Courts, however, can easily remedy this situation.
The district judge can require that "a plaintiff, who has voluntarily assumed the fiduciary role
of a class representative, does not abandon that role to the prejudice of the class he has assumed to represent or for his own improper personal aggrandizement." Shelton v. Pargo, Inc.,
582 F.2d 1298, 1306 (4th Cir. 1978); see Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 67
{S.D. Tex. 1977); see also Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 213 (1945). In exercising this
discretion, the court examines directly the reliance interest of absent class members. See
Shelton, 582 F.2d at 1315; Besse v. Verman, 60 F.R.D 414, 414-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Elias v.
National Car Rental Sys., 59 F.R.D. 276,277 {D. Minn. 1973). Because of this examination,
pre-certification settlement of individual actions will not prejudice class members, nor affect
the opt-out tolling question.
The second aspect of pre-certification settlement is when the class representative settles the
class claims. The defendant would then have every incentive not to oppose the certification
decision. See note 95 supra. With certification granted, rule 23(e} would then apply, and
courts would use the high standard of review described in the text. See text at notes 118-21
infra.
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and does not merely mantle oppression." 118 As a background for
this detailed review, the court must realize "the potential for abuse is
much greater when class actions are resolved through a settlement
• • • • " 119 To prevent any such abuse, "the district court acts as a
fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class
members." 120 With this high level of scrutiny, inadequate settlements
reached prior to certification stand little chance of approval, especially where class members object to the settlement. 121
Given that rule 23 provides several methods to protect the interests of the class, and to ensure class members the right to vindicate
their individual claims, tolling does not advance any policy of fair118. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1214 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
119. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). The court explained:
Because of the limited control exercised by any particular class member over the decision
to engage in these compromises, however, the settlement process is more susceptible than
adversarial adjudications to certain types of abuse. The interests oflawyer and class may
diverge, as may the interest of different members of the class, and certain interests may be
wrongfully compromised, betrayed, or "sold out" without drawing the attention of the
court. For this reason, in addition to requiring that the trial court evaluate whether a class
action settlement is "fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of collusion
between the parties," the law accords special protections, primarily ,procedural in nature,
to individual class members whose interests may be compromised 1n the settlement process. These _protections include notice, ensurini that class members know when their
rights are bemg compromised, and an opportumty to voice objections to the settlement.
576 F.2d at 1169 (citation omitted).
120. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 864 (1975); see Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973);
Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970); Watson v. Ray, 90 F.R.D. 143, 146 (S.D.
Iowa 1981) (court cannot assume a passive role in reviewing a class action settlement; court
must not only fulfill its own fiduciary obligation, but also prevent class representatives from
breaching their obligation). Other courts have also stressed that a primary function of the
review is to protect absent class members. See Vulcan Socy. of Westchester County, Inc. v.
Fire Dept. of City of White Plains, 505 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Foster v. BoiseCascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 679-80 (S.D. Tex. 1976), ajfd, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978);
Rubenstein v. Republic Natl. Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 347 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Seiffer v.
Topsy's Intl., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 622, 627 (D. Kan. 1976); Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F. Supp. 433,
437 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F.R.D. 346, 347-48 (S.D. Tex. 1974);
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 53 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs
Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
121. Class members have an opportunity to object because of the notice requirements of
rule 23(e). See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
Courts consider the objections of class members as relevant, though not conclusive, in assessing the fairness of the proposed settlement. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
576 F.2d 1157, 1215 (5th Cir. 1978) (settlement reversed on appeal), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1979); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976); Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 109 n.l (7th Cir. 1976) (The miniscule number of
objectors, 1/5 of 1% of the class, did not reduce in magnitude the serious issues raised; settlement upheld on appeal.); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 803 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1979); In
re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 305, 317-18 (D. Md. 1979)
(court carefully considered objections, but approved settlement); McNary v. American Sav. &
Loan Assn., 76 F.R.D. 644, 647-48, 650-51 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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ness reflected in the rule. These procedures, intervention, 122 appearing, 123 and subclassing, 124 allow class members to monitor and
correct any inadequate representation by the class plaintiffs. Instead
of opting out, the class member whose individual claim would be
time-barred can make aggressive use of these methods. 125 To the 'extent alternatives exist, the class member who desires to opt out is in a
much better position than other potential plaintiffs faced with a limitations problem. These other potential plaintiffs are barred completely.126 The class member is only restricted from pursuing an
independent action. 127 Left with a remedy to enforce their rights,
and with the procedural guarantees of fairness incorporated into rule
23, class members need not opt out to protect their interests.
Tolling, in any event, is irrelevant to the function of the opt-out
rule. The provision merely relieves the plaintiff from the binding
effect of the class action suit. 128 This relief from res judicata does not
122. See text at notes 102-07 supra.
123. See text at notes 108-10 supra.
124. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
125. The no-tolling rule will harm plaintiffs who have already opted out of class action
suits. Any harm suffered because of the refusal to toll, however, is more directly caused by the
plaintiffs failure to file on time. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text (absent a disability, a plaintiff with a large claim has no excuse for failing to file on time). The opted-out
plaintiff is in no worse position than any other time-barred plaintiff: Both suffer as a result of a
legislative decision to bar tardy claims. In one respect, the opted-out plaintiff merits even less
sympathy than others who are time-barred. By making the affirmative decision to opt out, the
plaintiff creates a statute of limitations problem where none existed before.
126. In American Pipe, for example, the plaintiffs would have been completely barred from
asserting their cause of action had the statute not been tolled. See American Pipe & Constr,
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 544 (1974) (motions for intervention were held time barred by the
district court).
127. Denying tolling does not deprive the opt-out plaintiff of any right of action she would
have enjoyed absent the class action; given class certification, which was denied in American
Pipe, the plaintiff can still vindicate her interests through the class action. See note 126supra,
128. See text at notes 8-9 supra.
The history of rule 23 suggests that the opt-out provision was intended not to create any
independent right, but solely to make the idea of binding absent class members by the class
action judgment more palatable. Prior to the 1966 Amendments, under the so-called "spurious" class actions, a class member was not bound by the judgment unless she intervened in the
action, and intervention could occur after the decision on the merits. See FED. R. C1v. P, 23
advisory committee notes on the 1966 amendments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966);
Frankel, supra note 7, at 43-46. For a discussion of this so-called "one-way intervention," see
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 545-47 (1974); see also Kalven & Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function ofthe Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV, 684, 710-14 (1941); .Developments in the Law- Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV, 874, 935
(1958).
The argument that class members should wait until certification before deciding whether to
file separate claims, see text at notes 91-99 supra, has been analogized to "one-way intervention." One co=entator, noting the potential for "sideline sitting," stated "class members
could await preliminary trial procedures and evaluate whether the outcome of the class action
might be favorable. If they think it will not be favorable to them, they could opt out with the
benefit of a tolled statute." Note, supra note 31, at 756 n.96. The 1966 Amendments sought to
cure this defect by subjecting all class members to the judgment before the decision on the
merits. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 547; FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on the
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create a right to bring an individual action; it just creates the option
to litigate independently whenever an individual action is possible.129 Tolling to extend an individual right of action goes beyond
permitting an individual to pursue private relief, by giving class
members more time in which to sue than they would enjoy if the
class action had never been filed. Thus considerations of fairness do
not support tolling the limitations period for opt-out plaintiffs.
2) Efficiency

Given that class members can cure defects in a certification order
and attack inadequate settlements, 130 it seems improbable that they
will rush to file protective motions. Less drastic alternatives than
1966 amendments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966). The basic purpose of the provision was to ensure fairness to class members, not to create independent rights. The original
version of the rule did not include an unconditional right to opt out. Kaplan, supra note 86, at
391 n.136 (court had discretion to deny opt-out to class members whose presence was found
"essential to fair adjudication"). Kaplan, reporter to the Advisory Committee from 1960 to
1966, suggests that the 23(c)(2) notice requirements, see note 7 supra and accompanying text,
'1oins with other features of the new rule in helping to justify the ultimate extension of the
judgment in (b)(3) cases to all members of the class, except those who requested exclusion
from the action. . . ." Kaplan, supra note 86, at 392. To the extent the opt-out provision was
inserted for vague notions of fairness, refusing to toll comports with these notions. See text at
notes 100-27 supra. But cf. FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on the 1966 amendments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104-05 (1966) (23(b)(3) respects individual's interest in prosecuting her own action).
The opt-out provision is not constitutionally required. The Supreme Court has long recognized that "the judgment in a 'class' or 'representative' suit . . . may bind members of the class
or those represented who were not parties to it." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
The isolated challenges to the modern rule 23 have been uniformly struck down by the courts.
See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 75 F.R.D. 727, 735-36 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Berland v.
Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see generally, 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86,
§ 2300a (discussion of Supreme Court due process precedent); id.§ 2475p; Developments in the
Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1402-16.
129. See note 128 supra; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) ("[E]ach
class member who can be identified through reasonable effort must be notified that he may
request exclusion from the action and thereby preserve his opportunity to press his claim separately : ..•") (emphasis added); 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 2475, at 157 (sample notice
states that opting out gives plaintiff freedom to pursue whatever legal rights he or she has);
Kaplan, supra note 86, at 391 (one who opts out is untouched by the class action and fends for
himself).
130. Even if the district court approves the inadequate settlement, the dissatisfied class
member still has several avenues of relief. First, approval of a settlement operates as a final
judgment which class members can appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). This right to appeal exists even though the class member could have opted out instead. See Ace Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 32 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1166 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (settlement overturned on appeal though
members could have excluded themselves), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). The aggrieved
member, however, should probably register objections at the settlement hearing if she has
notice of the hearing. See Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059, 1060 (7th Cir.
1970) (per curiam).
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a second ground for relief.
The rule allows a class member to move for relief from a final judgment because of surprise,
excusable neglect, fraud, misrepresentation, or "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). One commentator has noted, however,
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opting out exist to vindicate their interests. 131 The sketchy empirical
evidence available suggests that class members simply have not
wanted to opt out very often. 132 They opt out even less often for
reasons related to the conduct of the class action. 133 The relative
infrequency of opting out would seem to rebut any argument of numerous protective filings. The threat of such activity seems little
more than a trace of the problem faced in American Pipe, where the
denial of certification left class members with no remedy unless they
had previously filed protective motions.
In fact, a decision to allow tolling would significantly encourage
the waste of judicial resources, contrary to the policies behind class
actions. The opt-out tolling decision only arises where the court althat very few class members have used rule 60(b), and could point to none that have succeeded. See 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 5680, at 583.
A third avenue of relief is by collateral attack; a class member can initiate a separate suit
on the same cause of action as the class action, and so test the validity of the class action
judgment. See Frankel, supra note 7, at 46; FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee notes on
the 1966 amendments, reprinted in, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966) (res judicata effect of the class
action judgment can only be tested in a subsequent action); see generally Note, Collateral Attack on the .Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 83 HARV. L. REV. 589 (1974), Attacks on
the prior judgment will typically assert inadequate representation, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), or constitutionally defective notice of the settlement proposal,
See, e.g., Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 636-39 (N.D. Cal. 1978), opi11/011
adopted, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981).
131. These less drastic alternatives - intervening, appearing, and moving for a subclass also promote a more efficient use of judicial resources. See text at notes 134-44 i'!fra.
132. See, e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (discussion of how
few class members elect to opt out); 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 2475s ("only a small
number of absentees normally elect to be excluded"), A study of class action cases filed in the
District of Columbia from 1966 to 1974 provides some statistical data on the frequency of
exclusion. The study found that in two-thirds of the cases where notice was sent, fewer than
10% of the class members opted out. In only one case was the class size "substantially reduced," from 5800 members to 2300. See, Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical
Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1150 & n.154 (1974). A further indication of the relative infrequency of opt-outs is in the number of reported cases on the opt-out tolling question. Though
many class action suits are filed,see Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1311 (4th Cir. 1978);
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) ("class action suits, .• are
now an ever increasing burden to so many federal courts"); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479
F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Class actions have sprouted and multiplied like the leaves of
the green bay tree."), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Develop•
ments in the Law - Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1325 n.30 (5791 class actions pending on
December 31, 1975; 1886 class suits filed in the first half of the fiscal year 1976), relatively few
cases arise where opting out leads.to statutes of limitations problems. Only three cases have
had to resolve the tolling question. See Wood v. Combustion Engr., Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 346-47
(5th Cir. 1981); Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Cp., 485 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (N.D. Ala. 1980);
McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. ~ 61,359 (E.D. Mich,
1977).
133. See also 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 2475s (1977 & Supp. 1982).
An indication of the extent of ignorance can be found in cases where class members were
required to opt in. In one case, notice was sent to 114 putative class members, with instructions
to check the appropriate box for opting in. or to remain excluded. Ninety-one returned the
form, eighteen without checking either box. One individual checked both boxes, See Note,
supra note 132, at 1149.
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ready has determined the suit is maintainable as a class action. 134 In
reaching this conclusion, the court has made a finding that "a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy." 135 The court, after considering
"the interest of the members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution ... of separate actions," 136 and the efficiency of alternative procedures, 137 has decided the class action objectives will
be achieved. 138 By opting out, the plaintiff ignores this determination. The plaintiff insists on a second trial on essentially the same
facts and issues 139 with all the inefficiencies and inconsistencies
avoided by a class suit.1 40
In American Pipe, the Court tolled the statute for intervenors to
promote "the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the [class action] procedure." 141 The Court expected
the trial to proceed "as a joint suit, or as a principal suit with additional intervenors." 142 Refusing to toll for opt-out plaintiffs promotes these policies. Since tolling would sanction duplicative suits,
instead of the single trial envisioned by the Supreme Court, subsequent courts have refused to suspend the time bar. 143 Not tolling
134. See text at notes 7-8 supra. While a class member can file a suit at any time, she can
only "opt out" after the class has been certified.
135. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3). See Bantolina v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1116,
1122 n.24 (D. Hawaii 1976) (consider whether class action is the best procedure to promote
uniformity of decision and economy of time, effort, and expense); Frankel, supra note 7, at 43
(district court must find a class action to be the most fair, efficient, and just method to resolve
the dispute).
136. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
138. ''The rule [rule 23(b)(3)) requires the court to make a determination that the objectives of the class action procedure really will be achieved in the particular case." 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1779, at 59. If the objectives cannot be achieved, then
the class action is obviously not "superior to other available methods." See text at note 135
supra. For a discussion of considerations specifically listed in rule 23(b)(3), see 7A C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1780; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160.
139. If common questions did not predominate, the class would not meet the 23(b)(3) requirements. See text at note 6 supra.
140. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § 1160c (interests of (b)(3) action best served by a
single suit). Cf. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 7, ,i 23.45[4.-2), at 23-364 (2d ed.
1980) (discussing criteria for deciding superiority; stating that the existence of parallel lawsuits
shows there is an actual danger of multiple litigation and conflicting results).
141. 414 U.S. at 553. Note that the purpose of uniformity of decision was not relevant to
the American Pipe holding. Since all the plaintiffs sought to intervene, only one decision
would be rendered.
142. 414 U.S. at 555. Throughout the opinion, the Court constantly restated that its decision was limited to a situation where only one suit would proceed. See 414 U.S. at 551 (class
action filing tolls the statute of limitations for "all those who might subsequently participate in
the suit"); 414 U.S. at 552 (class members need not exercise any responsibility "in order to
profit from the eventual outcome of the case").
143. See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1982) (American Pipe tolling is only
for intervenors, otherwise the rule would be contrary to efficiency and economy of litigation);
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will encourage class members to seek vindication through the class
action suit. 144 Through methods such as intervention and appearances, all the class claims can be resolved efficiently and uniformly
in one action. Any other result would encourage tardy plaintiffs to
splinter the class suit into a series of cases.
To some extent, these arguments implicate the opt-out provision
itself as well as the suspension of the time bar. The opt-out right, in
the interest of fairness, inherently reduces judicial efficiency. But it
does not follow that the existence of the opt-out right means that the
overriding interest in judicial economy must yield in every instance.
Tolling exacerbates the conflict between the opt-out provision and
the rule's broader goals; courts that allow tolling needlessly aggravate this problem 145
The difficulty of defending the opt-out provision at all 146 argues
against expanding the provision by tolling at the expense of class
Gluck v. Amicor Inc., 487 F. Supp. 608, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (concern in American Pipe was
furthering judicial efficiency and economy); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (D.D.C. 1978) (opposed to tolling for one who opts
out because it would sanction duplicative suits), revrl. on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); cf. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 7,
~ 23.02[1) (class actions are increasingly used because of a need to decrease multiplicity of
suits).
The court in finding the (b)(3) class action superior, see notes 134-38 supra and accompanying text, has decided that it is desirable to have the suit in one forum to prevent duplicative
effort. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 1779, at 60.
144. Because the plaintiff is seeking a benefit fortuitously acquired through the class action
procedure, it is equitable to make him or her advance the class action procedure's policies. The
benefit is fortuitously acquired because after having neglected to file his or her own suit on
time, the plaintiff is relying on the lucky coincidence that someone else filed a class action
within the statutory period that included the plaintiff. The plaintiff, fortuitously included in the
class action, now seeks the benefit of tolling.
145. It is important to emphasize that the opt-out provision does not create an independent
right of action, but only ensures that the bringing of a class action does not cut off whatever
individual cause of action would otherwise exist. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying
text. Permitting tolling would not protect the individual's independent cause of action, but
would create an individual cause of action that would not exist absent the class suit. The
compromise between procedural fairness and judicial economy reflected in the opt-out provision itself does not, therefore, extend to the artificial prolonging of private rights of action, for
the refusal to toll does not deprive the plaintiff of any individual right recognized by rule 23.
146. One commentator has noted:
Federal courts have generally narrowly construed the self-exclusion provision of rule 23.
Where an action can be maintained under sections (b)(l) and/or (b)(2), and also under
section (b)(3), courts have almost invariably ruled that the suit should be brought under
(b)(l) and/or (b)(2). See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Assn. 389 F. S-upp. 867,
903 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Moreover, in a number of cases where the issue was whether absentees had moved to opt
out within the time set by the court, or, where pleading lack of notice or excusable neglect,
the absentees filed motions for exclusion after the expiration of the opt-out period, courts
have placed the burden of proof on the absentees, and have regularly ruled against them.
See, e.g., In re National Student Mktg. Litig. v. Barnes Plaintiffs, 530 F.2d 1012, 1014-15
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1075),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1659 (1976); Manhattan-Ward, Inc. v. Ginnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183,
1185 (2d Cir. 1974).
.Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1488 n.188.
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action policies. Allowing members to opt out does not necessarily
reduce differences of opinion within the class. 147 Furthermore, those
with divergent interests, those likely to opt out, if forced to remain in
the action could inform the court of the possible heterogeneity
within the class or defend the interests of absent members. 148
Moreover, the suit of one who opts out may be consolidated with the
class action. 149 The opt-out plaintiff would end up little better than
an intervenor, 150 but only after a considerable waste of judicial resources. Finally, the right to opt out is meaningful only to the extent
that it insulates an individual from the judgment in the class action.
Even in a rule 23(b)(3) action, stare decisis can defeat to some degree the opt-out plainti.tfs ability to bring a successful individual action.151 In short, the practical defects of the opt-out provision render
unwise any judicial expansion of its scope.
Tolling the statute of limitations, then, would undermine the
class action policies. By encouraging separate suits, it would encourage precisely the multiplicity of suits and waste of judicial resources which the American Pipe court wanted to avoid.
147. See id. at 1488. Several courts have held that the existence of an opt-out right under
rule 23(c)(2) cannot be relied upon to eliminate differences within a purported class, and hence
cannot substitute for the normal 23(a) and 23(b)(3) requirements. See, e.g., Phillips v. Klassen,
502 F.2d 362, 367 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Lukena v. Briyie's Mt. Resort,
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 69, 72-73 (W.D. Va. 1975), qffd., 538 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1976); Matarazzo v.
Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 68-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Free World Foreign Cars,
Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); .Developments in the Law - Class
Actions, supra note 8, at 1488.
148. See .Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1488. The active class
member with divergent interests possibly represents inactive members with similar interests.
Id. If the class is heterogeneous, subclassing would be a more efficient solution than allowing
many separate suits. See text at note 111 supra.
149. Rule 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question oflaw or fact are :pending before the court, it
may order a joint heanng or trial of any or all the matters in 1Ssue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
FED. R. C1v. P 42(a). See also l H. NEWBERG, supra note 86, § l 160i, at 281 (noting Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969), in which over 40 individual
suits, filed after defendants successfully opposed class certification in a earlier decision, were
consolidated for pretrial purposes under 28 U.S.C. §1407 (1976) and ultimately upheld as a
class); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 5.00-5.40 (1973) (recommending that similar cases be assigned to one
judge, even in multidistrict litigation; the judge then considers whether to consolidate the actions).
Consolidation is possible because the opt-out plaintiff's claim has similar questions of law
or fact to the class suit. See text at note 6 supra.
150. See text at notes 102-07 supra.
151. See .Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 8, at 1488. Stare decisis
could limit the effectiveness of any later suits either through procedural rulings, such as the
admissibility of evidence, or through interpretations of the controlling law. Other, less formal,
influences from the class action might also affect the later separate action. The judge in the
later case, for example, might heed the earlier rulings on the ,i;cope of discovery or the factual
existence of an evidentiary privilege.
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CONCLUSION

The lack of an affirmative reason justifying tolling, and the deleterious effects of tolling on class action policies, mandate that courts
refuse to toll for opt-out plaintiffs for the period during which they
remain class members. Any contrary rule would "sanction duplicative suits and violate the policies behind American Pipe." 152 Adequately protected by rule 23 safeguards, the class members can
vindicate their claims through the class suit without the need of a
tolling rule.

152. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999,
1012 (D.D.C. 1978), revd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).

